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Effectively Implementing Civilian
Oversight Boards to Ensure Police
Accountability and Strengthen PoliceCommunity Relations
KEVIN KING*

I.

Introducing the Need for Civilian Oversight Boards
to Curb Police Misconduct
It stops today.1

On July 17, 2014, at about 4:45 p.m., Officer Justin Damico and
Officer Daniel Pantaleo approached Eric Garner to arrest him for
selling untaxed cigarettes. 2 Eric was arrested on the same charge a
few months prior as well as in the previous week. 3 This time, Eric
was upset and protested, stating, "Every time you see me you, you
want to mess with me. I'm tired of it. It stops today." 4 Officer
Damico responded, "What are you making a scene for?" Eric was
insistent and explained, "Every time you see me you want to harass
me, you want to stop me, tell me I'm selling cigarettes. I'm minding
my business, officer. I'm minding my business. Please just leave me

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2015. B.A.,
University of California, Santa Barbara, 2012. The author would like to thank his mother,
Gloria Benard, for instilling in him the strength and resolve to pursue social justice. This
Note is dedicated, in loving memory, to Shirley Guyton for her eternal love and nurturing.
1. Josh Sanburn, Behind the Video of Eric Garner'sDeadly Confrontation With New York
Police, TIME (July 22, 2014), http://time.com/3016326/eric-garner-video-police-choke
hold-death.
2. Staten Island Man Dies After Police Try to Arrest Him, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/nyregion/staten-island-an-dies-after-police-tryto-arrest-him.html; Joseph Goldstein, A Cigarettefor 75 Cents, 2for $1: The Brisk, Shady Sale of
'Loosies,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, at Al.
3. Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man's Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue
for the Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2014, at Al.
4. Id.
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alone. I told you the last time. Please just leave me alone." 5
Officer Pantaleo then approached Eric from behind and began
attempting to place him in handcuffs. 6 Eric put his hands up and
repeated, "Please don't touch me. Don't touch me please." 7 Officer
Pantaleo responded by grabbing Eric by the neck and placing him in
a chokehold.8 Two additional officers responded. 9 In a jerking
motion, Officer Pantaleo pulled Eric to the ground by his neck and
sustained the chokehold. 10 As he was about to hit the ground, Eric
gasped for air.11 Shortly after, Officer Pantaleo released the
chokehold and placed both hands on the top of Eric's head as he laid
face down.12 Officer Pantaleo immediately pushed Eric's face into
the pavement as the other officers placed him in handcuffs.' 3 As this
happened, Eric repeated, "I can't breathe. I can't breathe. I can't
breathe." 14 Seconds later, Eric was laid on his side, limp and
16
unresponsive.' 5 Eric was suffering from cardiac arrest.
Emergency medical services (hereinafter "EMS") arrived at the
scene four minutes later.' 7 While waiting, one officer checked Eric's
pulse and another searched his pockets. 18
Eric remained in
handcuffs. Once an emergency medical technician (hereinafter
"EMT") arrived, she asked, "Sir, is anything hurting right now?" 19
Eric remained unresponsive. 20 His head dangled limp. An officer
21
informed him, "Sir, EMS is here. Answer their questions, O.K.?"
Eric remained unresponsive. 22 The EMT then felt for a pulse, tapped
him, and said, "Sir, it's EMS. Come on. We're here to help,
alright?" 23 Eric remained unresponsive. 24 Shortly after that, the
5. Sanburn, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Goldstein & Schweber, supra note 3.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 4 Emergency Workers Put on Desk Duty in Eric GarnerCase; New Video Released, CBS
N.Y. (July 20, 2014), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2014/07/20/in-church-rev-al-sharptonappeals-for-justice-in-choke-hold-death.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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officers removed the handcuffs, placed Eric in a stretcher and EMS
25
transported him to Richmond University Medical Center.
26
Eric was 43 years old and a father of six. On July 17th, 2014, he
protested years of harassment at the hands of law enforcement. He
was insistent - "It stops today!" Tragically, he was right. His
lifelong struggle with law enforcement ended with his death. Upon
conducting the autopsy, a spokeswoman for the New York City
Medical Examiner stated that Eric died from neck compressions (the
chokehold), the compression of his chest, and his prone position
while being physically restrained by police. 27 Asthma, heart disease,
and obesity were listed as contributing factors. 28 In 2014, Eric died
from the same chokehold that the New York Police Department
(hereinafter "NYPD") banned its officers from using in 1993.29
30
Mike Brown had to die for our voices to be heard.

Tragedies such as the killing of Eric Garner, spark widespread
distrust in police forces and are often used as a platform for activism.
Activists seek punishment of accused police officers and policy
changes to mold and monitor police conduct. Civilian oversight
boards have been an essential aspect of police misconduct
prevention strategy. 31 These boards are entities separate from police
departments, designed to handle civilian complaints about police
misconduct. 32 They are largely comprised of civilians who are not
sworn police officers. 33 The purpose of these boards is to give every
civilian the opportunity to correct any perceived injustice. These
boards are present in most major cities and are often formed shortly
after a major tragedy, such as the killing of Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Missouri. 34
24. CBS NEWS, supra note 16
25. Id.
26. Goldstein & Schweber, supra note 3.
27. Jake Pearson, Autopsy: Police Chokehold Caused NYC Man's Death, ASSOCIATED PRFSS
(Aug. 1, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/artide/medical-examiner-says-chokehold-policeofficer-caused-death-nyc-man-ruled-homicide.
28. Id.

29. Goldstein & Schweber, supra note 3.
30. Julie Bosman, Outrage and Calls for Change Follow Ferguson Officials Into Council
Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2014, at A12.
31. SAMUEL WALKER, CITIZEN

REVIEW RESOURCE MANUAL 3 (Police Executive

Research Forum, 1995).

32. Id.
33. Id. at 4.
34. Samuel Walker, The History of the Citizen Oversight, in CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (Justina Cint6n Perino ed., American Bar Association, 2006).
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On August 9, 2014, Ferguson Police Officer David Wilson shot
and killed unarmed 18-year-old Michael Brown.35 Officer Wilson
stopped Michael and his friend Dorian Johnson as they were
walking in the middle of Canfield Drive. 36 Shortly after, a struggle
37
broke out between Michael and Officer Wilson near the patrol car.
One shot was fired during the struggle. 38 After that, Michael began
to run away. 39 Officer Wilson continued shooting and fatally
wounded Michael. 40 Michael was at least 35 feet away from the
patrol car when Officer Wilson shot him.41 Officer Wilson shot
42
Michael a total of six times, including twice in the head.
43
Just days after the
There are still several facts in dispute.
incident, Ferguson Police Chief Thomas Jackson released
surveillance video of Michael allegedly robbing a store clerk of
cigars. 44 However, Chief Jackson also stated that Officer Wilson was
unaware of the alleged robbery and his reason for stopping Michael
and Dorian was unrelated to the suspected robbery. 45 Rather, Chief
Jackson claimed that Officer Wilson stopped Michael and Dorian for
jaywalking. 46 In a press conference, St. Louis County Police Chief
Jon Belmar stated that Michael and Officer Wilson were struggling
47
over the officer's handgun immediately before the first shot fired.
Several witnesses stated that Michael raised his hands and
48
surrendered before Officer Wilson continued firing.
Shortly after the shooting, protestors nationwide organized,
renewed their demand for officer accountability, and held
demonstrations. 49 On September 9, 2014, the Ferguson City Council
35. Frances Robles & Julie Bosman, Autopsy Shows Michael Brown Was Struck at Least
6 Times, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2014, at Al.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Maya Srikrishnan, Police Shooting Roils Town, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2013, at A9.
44. Greg Botelho & Don Lemon, Ferguson Police Chief: Officer Didn't Stop Brown as
Robbery Suspect, CNN (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/15/us/missouriteen-shooting.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Srikrishnan, supra note 43.
48. Id.; Randi Kaye, New Michael Brown Shooting Witnesses Describe Scene, CNN (Sept. 11,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/10/us/ferguson-michael-brown-shooting-witnesses.
49. Ryan J. Reilly & Amanda Terkel, Ferguson Fightsfor Justice Beyond Mike Brown's Death,
HUFFINGTON PosT (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/24/fergusonmike-brown_n_5697855.htnl.
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50
The
proposed an ordinance to create a civilian oversight board.
concluding section of this Note contains recommendations for
51
Ferguson's proposed board.

While implementing civilian oversight boards is an appropriate
response to police brutality, it is problematic when local
governments wait until boards become necessary as a response rather
than taking the initiative to implement them as preventative. In the

wake of the Michael Brown killing, Deborah Young of Ferguson,
Missouri, expressed her frustration when she spoke before the

Ferguson City Council about curbing police misconduct: "Mike

Brown had to die for our voices to be heard." 52 Civilian oversight
boards are not present in all major cities, including Bakersfield,
California, where many residents have demanded that one be
3
created after the David Silva killing in 2013.5
Police misconduct goes beyond tragic homicide. Civilians often
complain of excessive force, disrespect via racial slurs, harassment,
and other grievances not suited to be solved through civil or
criminal proceedings. Police officers have unique power in being
able to use deadly force and other intrusive means of carrying out
their duties. When a civilian is handcuffed, ordered to lay on the
ground, thrown to the ground, and tased to the ground, they can feel
the most atrocious infringement of their liberty.5 4 Civilians are often
further enraged because they do not perceive this exercise of power
as legitimate and justified.5 5 Thus, when submitting complaints,
civilians are not always seeking recourse for the most egregious
offenses. 56 Instead, they may simply be searching for an explanation
for the officer's actions, an apology, and assurance that illegitimate
action will cease. What do civilians do with these frustrations and
what are their remedies, if any?
Civilian oversight boards are not the only appropriate spheres to
receive civilian complaints and create policy change in law
50. FERGUSON

CITY COUNCIL, MEETING AGENDA

2 (Sept. 9, 2014), available at
7

http://www.fergusoncity.com/AgendaCenter/ViewFile/Agenda/09092014-2 5.
51. See infra Part VI.
52. Bosman, supra note 30.
53. David Silva died while Kern County police officers were attempting to arrest him
for public intoxication. After David resisted arrest, the officers released a K-9 to attack him
and beat him until he became unresponsive. He suffered a heart attack and died shortly
after. Mike Fagans, Timeline Surrounding David Sal Silva's Death, THE BAKERSFIELD
CALIFORNIAN (June 1, 2013), http://www.bakersfieldCalifornian.com/local/x480782606/
Timeline-surrounding-David-Sal-Silvas-death.
54. Sue Quinn, Citizen Complaints and Mediation, in CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF LAW

ENFORCEMENT 127, 131 (Justina Cintron Perino ed., American Bar Association, 2006).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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Police misconduct has been limited by Fourth
enforcement.
Amendment and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 57 Civilians are
protected from searches and seizures without probable cause and are
less susceptible to involuntary confessions resulting from police
interrogation tactics. 58 However, police officers can still circumvent
these rights by attaining consent. 59 Thus, there is a continued need for
additional protective measures. For instance, if a civilian is aware that
they have the right to refuse a consent search, then they may be more
likely to assert that right. Requiring that officers give such an
admonition may suffice. However, such an admonition is currently not
required by law because actual knowledge of the right to refuse consent
is not essential to demonstrate voluntariness. 60 Additionally, police
departments across the country have begun experimenting with bodymounted cameras, which would ensure transparency. 61 Thus, although
civilian oversight boards are not the absolute cure for stopping police
misconduct, when implemented effectively, they can serve as one
pivotal instrument among a greater strategy.
Critics of civilian oversight boards argue that they are
unnecessary because [1] there are several other avenues in curbing
police misconduct and [2] boards are ineffective. 62 However, since
police misconduct is such a broad and complex issue, there is no onesize-fits-all remedy.
Constitutional protections invoked during
criminal proceedings do not address more minor allegations and
therefore are not an effective deterrent. For instance, in criminal
proceedings, the remedy for an improper search and seizure is
suppression of evidence. 63 This remedy does not prevent police
64
officers from acting first and dealing with the consequences later.
Criminal proceedings have no bearing on them personally, so those
consequences are relatively minor. 65 Further, this type of judicial
oversight in criminal proceedings does nothing to regulate illegal
57. See generally JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSION: THE RULES,
RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES THAT STRIKE THE BALANCE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND ORDER

(Oxford University Press, 2011).
58. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
59. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,358 (1967).
60. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
61. Ian Lovett, In California, a Champion for Police Cameras, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,

2013, at A12.
62. James R. Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, 36 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 515,517 (1971).
63. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648.
64. Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in Court, N.Y. TIMES (May
12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/nyregion/12guns.html.
65. Id.
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searches and seizures that do not result in a formal arrest and charge.
Civil litigation is also ineffective. The most viable civil suits

spawned by police misconduct frequently involve a wrongful death
or excessive force. United States Supreme Court precedent has also
limited an individual's ability to use equitable relief as an instrument

for policy change. In Rizzo v. Goode, the Court overturned an
injunction issued by the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania ordering Philadelphia's Mayor, City Managing
Director, and supervisory police officials to submit a plan for
handling civilian complaints of police misconduct. 66 The Court held
that such an injunction was an unwarranted intrusion on official
discretion because future injury was too attenuated. 67 In City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, Adolph Lyons requested that the Court grant
injunctive relief by ordering the Los Angeles Police Department
(hereinafter "LAPD") to terminate its chokehold policy, which
caused a minimum of 16 deaths from 1975 to 1983.68 Twelve of these
victims were African- American men. 69 However, the Court held
that Mr. Lyons lacked standing because he failed to prove that he
was in immediate danger of irreparable injury. 70 Arguments of past
injury and a pattern of discriminatory implementation were too

speculative to predict future harm. 71 Such jurisprudence has created
a void in curbing police misconduct.
Are internal affairs (hereinafter "IA") investigations sufficient in
both holding law enforcement accountable and serving civilian
needs? There is a fundamental problem with giving internal affairs
full discretionary power to hold police officers accountable. Often
civilians simply do not trust the police to police themselves. As Bob
Aaronson, Independent Police Auditor/Ombudsman of Davis,
California, stated in a 2007 interview, "There are instances where
[internal affairs bureaus] will have a tendency[,] in order to avoid
the limelight or [I the harsh reality[,].. .to find a way to avoid getting
to the right result." 72 The Denver Office of the Independent Auditor
made a similar finding with regard to their Sheriff's Department. 73
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380-81 (1976).
Id. at 366.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 115-16 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 111.

71. Id.

72. David M. Greenwald, Interview with Davis Police Ombudsman Bob Aaronson,
PEOPLE'S VANGUARD OF DAVIS (Aug. 17, 2007), http://davisvanguard.blogspot.com/
2007/08/interview-with-davis-police-ombudsman.html.
73. DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, 2013 SEMIANNUAL REPORT 21 (2013),
availableat http://www.denvergov.org/Portals/374/documents/Semiannual-Report-
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They noted that, from January 2011 to June 2013, there were 861
grievances filed by inmates regarding excessive force, sexual
harassment, and usage of racial and ethnic slurs. 74 Fifty-four of these
complaints were considered "serious misconduct" and only nine
were investigated. 75 Out of the 788 complaints against deputies, 125
(16%) were against the same four officers, who comprised 0.57% of
their police force.76 These figures demonstrate a likelihood that
some complaints against these officers had merit and expose IA's
failure to investigate.
Failure in the police holding each other accountable may result
from a "blue fraternity" in which police officers protect one another
at all costs and shun those that break the "Blue Wall of Silence" by
putting holistic justice first. 77 Others within the police department
may perceive IA bureaus as the "rat squad" because the bureau's
effectiveness largely depends on the cooperation of other police
officers. 78 There is a general disdain for police officers that cooperate
with IA, which is not conducive to running an effective bureau. 79
This "blue culture" can result in officers' failing to convey the full
truth or outright lying to IA officers. For instance, former NYPD
Officer Michael Dowd stated, "I had been in internal affairs
investigations a couple of times, and they were very easy to breeze
through. I answered a few questions. I lied through every answer,
and I went back to patrol."S0
Furthermore, IA staff themselves may exhibit bias in favor of
police officers when conducting interviews. 81 In a 1998 monitoring
report, the Portland, Oregon Police Internal Investigations Auditing
Committee noted the following issues after listening to interview tapes:

Final_2013-12-02.pdf.
74. DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 73, at 12.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 21.
77. CITY OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION
AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPT., COMM'N REPORT 53 (July
7, 1994) [hereinafter REPORT OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE POLICE CORRUPTION],
availableat http://www.parc.info/client-files/special%20Reports/4% 20-%2Mollen%
20Commission%20%20NYPD.pdf.
78. Al Baker & Jo C. McGinty, N.Y.P.D. Confidential, N.Y. TLMES, Mar. 28,2010, at MB1.
79. Id.
80. Lynne Wilson, Cops vs. Citizen Review, COVERT ACTION Q. 55 (1996), available at
http://mediafilter.org/CAQ/CAQ55.copsVscr.html.
81. CITIZEN ADVISORS TO THE POLICE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS AUDITING COMM.,

SECOND/THIRD QUARTER 1998 MONITORING REPORT 6 (1998), available at http://www
.portland online.com/auditor/index.cfm?&a=8776&c=27389.

Winter 2015] EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTING CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT BOARDS 99

[U]nnecessary leading questions, mostly in officer
interviews; unstructured interviews with a somewhat
casual tone, in which officers are allowed virtually
uninterrupted narratives with very little close examination
or follow-up questioning; ... abbreviated officer interviews,

sometimes less than ten minutes with officers accused
ofsignificant excessive or unauthorized use of force; ...
failure to routinely inquire about any potential witnesses;
...uneven focus on complainant actions, sometimes to the

82
neglect of officer actions.

IA officers may simply feed the police officers a story or allow
officers to give an unchallenged version of theirs. Thus, an "impartial
83
liaison" would be more effective in getting all of the facts on the table.
With regard to complainant interviews, the adversarial nature of
civilian-IA interaction may make civilians feel as if their complaints are
futile and will not be handled appropriately.8 4 Accordingly, civilians
may not be comfortable relaying their complaints to a department
directly linked to the perceived oppressor. Additionally, civilians may
also be met with hostility and face hurdles created by intake officers,
such as lengthy waits before completing the process or failure to
For these reasons, civilian
accommodate different languages.8 5
oversight boards can fill the void in serving as an objective liaison.
Civilian oversight boards have had a mixed record in their
effectiveness. This Note will address various reasons for the failure of
some boards and present a blueprint for creating long-standing,
efficient, and effective boards. This Note theorizes that a board's
success depends on the board's legitimacy in formation, mayoral and
police department support, and structure. Most importantly, civilian
oversight boards must be fundamentally rooted in serving the
community they were created for. Empowering civilians, improving
relations, promoting change within law
community-police
enforcement agencies, and increasing police transparency must be
essential goals of all boards.

82. CITIZEN ADVISORs TO THE POLICE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS AUDITING COMM.,
supra note 81.
83. CITIZEN ADVISORS To THE POLICE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS AUDITING COMM.,
FOURTH QUARTER 1997 MONITORING REPORT 2 (1998), availableat http://www.portland
online.com/auditor/index.cfm?&a=8771&c=27389.

84. Quinn, supra note 54, at 131.
85. REPORT OF THE INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEPT. xix (1991), available at
http://www.parc.info/client-files/Special%/20Reports/120-%20Chistopher%20
Conmusion.pdf.
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II. Identifying Types of Civilian Oversight Boards and
Their Respective Flaws
There are three types of civilian oversight boards, which I have
labeled "independent investigatory," "pure monitoring," and
"auditing boards." Many boards are multi-functioning, but can be
categorized by their main function. Civilian boards can also be more
broadly categorized as "external" or "internal." For the purposes of
this Note, external boards function independently from Internal
Affairs and are staffed by their respective government bodies.
Internal boards may still consist of government appointed members,
but operate solely based on work produced by IA.
A.

Independent Investigatory Boards

Independent investigatory boards largely focus on the civilian
complaint process.86 They have both an independent complaint
intake and investigation process. 87 They sometimes have the power to
hold hearings, subpoena police officers for interviews and hearings,
and make recommendations to the chief of police.8 8 Because the
complaint process is often completely detached from IA, there is no
"police policing themselves" issue.
However, issues may also arise from the adversarial tension
created by these boards. For instance, Barry Donelan, President of
the Oakland Police Officers' Association, expressed concern that
independent investigatory boards have an inherent bias, which
could cause them to "spin complaints" at the intake phase.8 9 This
bias could potentially permeate into the investigation and deposition
phases, running counter to a main objective of truth finding.
On the logistical side, independent investigatory boards face
funding, staffing, and efficiency issues. For example, a 2007 audit of
the San Francisco Office of Civil Complaints (hereinafter "OCC") by
the city controller's office revealed several institutional flaws. 90
86. Samuel Walker, Alternative Models of Citizen Oversight, in CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT 11, 12 (Justina Cint6n Perino ed., American Bar Association, 2006).

87. Id.
88. Merrick Bobb, Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States, 22 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 151, 163 (2003).
89. Matthew Artz, Oakland Police Department Overseer Blocks Council's Police Reform,

CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Sep. 12, 2013), http://www.contracostatimes.com/news/
ci_24082697/opd-overseer-blocks-councils-police-reformee.
90. Jaxon Van Derbeken, Audit Rips Police Complaints Office / OCC Called Mismanaged,
Inefficient and Understaffed - Morale Seen as Poor, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 23,2007), http://www.sf
gate.com/bayarea/article/san-francisco-Audit-rips-police-complaints-2655009.php.
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"Auditors found that the [OCC] fails to perform its basic mission of
timely investigation of civilian complaints against police, and they
raised questions about ethical standards at the agency." 91 From 2003
to 2006, the OCC failed to complete investigations and report findings
53% of the time it attempted to meet its statutory deadline of nine
months after receiving the complaint. 92 Furthermore, individuals
largely responsible for the delays were not held accountable and
93
employee surveys revealed that morale was down.
Staffing issues can be partially solved through funding and the
requirement of a specific investigator-police officer ratio. For
instance, per the City Charter, the San Francisco OCC requires one
investigator for every 150 police officers and allows funding for a
temporary investigator when there is a deficit. 94 Personnel, training
and protocol issues can be solved through leadership within the
board. Creating protocol manuals and formal training are a crucial
solution, as stated by Joyce M. Hicks, the Executive Director of the
OCC who took office shortly after the 2006 audit.95
B.

Pure Monitoring Boards

In contrast, pure monitoring boards do not take part in the

complaint process, but focus on conducting policy analysis of police
protocol and practice. They are granted access to records in IA
investigations and use these records to identify patterns in an effort
to create systematic change.
Upon spotting an issue and
constructing a solution, these boards make recommendations to the
chief of police. The City of Claremont Police Commission serves as a
pure monitoring board.96 The Commission is designed to be
interactive in order to "facilitate dialogue [between the community
and the Police Department] on issues of concern regarding the Police
Department" and is empowered to review police department
policies, procedures, and practices. 97
This includes police
recruitment and training programs, customer service programs,

91. Van Derbeken, supra note 90.

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. S.F., CAL., MUN. CODE art. IV, § 4.127 (2004).
95. Episode #32: Joyce Hicks, Executive Director, San Francisco Office of Citizen
Complaints, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE CONVERSATIONS PODCAST WITH DAVID ONEK, 5-6
(Apr. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Joyce Hicks Interview with David Onek], available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/CrimJusPoEpisode32.doc.pdf.
96. CLAREMONT, CAL., MUN. CODE § 2.43 (2014).

97. Id.
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crime trends and statistics, and crime prevention programs. 98 These
prospective-type boards are ideal for creating systematic change and
getting to the root of police misconduct issues. However, they do
not solve the issue of building community confidence that
individual complaints will be handled fairly and objectively.
C.

Auditing Boards

Auditing boards focus on the complaint process and ensure that
the investigation remains thorough, fair, accurate, and effective. 99
Auditing boards work closely with IA bureaus and thus have access
to many of their records, 100 such as complaint logs and investigation
reports. These boards also serve a policy function by identifying and
monitoring trends within the police department. 101 Some auditing
boards conduct intakes for "people who do not feel comfortable
1 °2
going directly to the Department" and forward those intakes to IA.
Some boards audit investigations as they occur, while others simply
review IA investigations upon completion.103 In boards that audit an
investigation as it occurs, a board representative may sit in on an
interview that the IA investigator is conducting and chime in with
additional questions.104 They may also ask that additional people be
interviewed and request additional evidence. 0 5 According to the
Executive Director of the San Francisco OCC, post-investigation
auditing is limited because mistakes are tough to correct after
completion. 06 It is more efficient to correct potential mistakes as
they occur. 10 7 Also, some auditing boards have an appeals process
08
for civilians discontent with IA findings.

98. CLAREMONT, CAL., MUN. CODE § 2.43.

99. Stephen Clark, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of How
Civilian Oversight of the Police Should Function and How it Fails, 43 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 1, 15-16 (2009).

100. Id. at 16.
101. Id. at 17-18.
102. Independent Police Auditor/Ombudsman, CITY OF DAVIS, http://police.cityofdavis
.org/independent-police-auditor-ombudsman (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
103. Jeff Humphrey, Straub: Police Oversight OrdinanceCould Bring Transparency,KXLY
(Dec. 6,2013), http://www.kxly.com/news/spokane-news/straub-police-oversight-ordin
ance-could-bring-transparency/-/101214/23365878/-/lmj7ld/-/index.h tml.
104. Humphrey, supra note 103.
105. Id.
106. Joyce Hicks Interview with David Onek, supra note 95, at 15.
107. Id.
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The Office of Independent Review (hereinafter "OIR") Group is
a prevalent business model auditing team used throughout
California. 109 It is comprised of a "group of individuals well versed
and experienced in independent law enforcement oversight and
review." 110 Michael Gennaco, graduate of Stanford Law School and
former Chief of the Civil Rights Section at the U.S. Attorney's Office
for the Central District of California, serves as the Chief Attorney."'
OIR has contracted with dozens of California cities in both
temporary projects and long-term oversight.1 2 It currently serves as
the sole form of civilian oversight for Burbank, Fresno, Fullerton,
Palo Alto, Fresno County, Los Angeles County, Orange County, and
San Diego County. 113 Each subdivision produces annual reports that
assesses the complaint process, identifies trends, and gives policy
recommendations as needed."14 OIR's monitoring team collaborates
with FTI Consulting, Inc., a global business advisory firm, which
provides statistical and data analysis support."15
Some cities and counties have abandoned the traditional
civilian-oriented model and hired OIR to test out their model.1 6 For
example, in September 2013, Fullerton's city council dismissed a
proposal for an external civilian oversight board and voted 4-1 to
hire the OIR Group as an independent auditor.1 7 Police Chief Dan
Hughes advocated for the OIR Group.1 8 He spoke to its benefits
through annual reports to the city council and "real time reviews" of
critical incident investigations.1 9 This was not the first time that a
leader in the police department publicly expressed support for the
OIR Group. In 2008, Sheriff Sandra Hutchens of the Orange County
Sheriff's Department supported implementing the proposed OIR
board when the Board of Supervisors voted to begin contracting
with the OIR Group. 20 Hutchens remained supportive three years
109. OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW, PROPOSAL TO SERVE AS DECREE MONITOR OF
THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 0uly 24, 2012), availableat http://www.justice

.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/nopdrfpoir.pdf.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 10-19.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 7, 11-12.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Gabriel S. Roman, Fullerton City Council Dismisses Citizens Review Board, O.C.
WEEKLY (Sep. 18, 2013), http://blogs.ocweekly.com/navelgazing/2013/09/fullertoncouncilallows polic.php.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Norberto Santana Jr., Jail Death Results in New Oversight Panel,O.C. REGISrER (Aug.
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later when the Board of Supervisors, in a 3-2 vote, put the Office of
Independent Review on a 6-month probationary period for failing to
121
produce promised results.
Critics of the OIR Group state that they do not provide enough
emphasis on community involvement and simply become puppets of
the police department. 122 When the Orange County OIR was under
fire in 2008, Supervisor Pat Bates stated, "It's become very obvious to
me that [OIR] has been a great resource to our Sheriff's Department
... almost a mentor ... We need to have an independent third party
review, and that is not the way this office is operating." 123 Further,
when Fullerton Mayor Bruce Whitaker cast the lone vote against
hiring the OIR Group in 2013, he explained, "I think that [the OIR
Group] misses the mark at least in terms of a truly independent model
of oversight.
I would like to see more insight into what's
happening." 124 Community outreach and transparency are essential
to a successful oversight board. 125 Thus, a fundamental flaw in the
OIR business model is that "independent" review is not equivalent to
"civilian" review.

III. Creation of Boards and the Bearing on Board
Legitimacy
Civilian oversight boards can be created in a multitude of ways,
including through municipal ordinance, municipal resolution,
county ordinance, local voter referendum, state statute, mayoral
executive order, police chief administrative order and, more
recently, city/county contracting.126 The most common route has
been through municipal ordinance. This is often the most practical
way of creation because an ordinance, by nature, allows for
immediate creation after a tragic incident. After creation, these
boards can be further legitimized and become long-standing via

5,2008), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/county-196707-sheriff-supervisors.html.
121. Norberto Santana Jr., County's Office of Independent Review Gets Six-Month Notice,
VOICE OF O.C. (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.voiceofoc.org/countywide/county-govem
ment/articlee05afadc-cf4-11e0-b8b4-001cc4c002e0.html.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Roman, supra note 116.
125. Lauri K. Stewart, Community Outreach and Public Education in Citizen Oversight,
in CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 147,147 (Justina Cint6n Perino ed., Am. Bar

Ass'n, 2006).
126. Richard Jerome, Credibility, Impartiality,and Independence in Citizen Oversight, in
CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 21, 42 (Justina Cint6n Perino ed., Am. Bar

Ass'n, 2006).
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voter referendum. The cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach serve
as examples of boards that were initially created through ordinances
127
and later made permanent through voter referendums.
A board's legitimacy is often dependent of the way that it was
created, which may affect funding and police cooperation. 128
Municipal resolutions are a formal expression of the opinion of a city
council adopted by vote. Ordinances provide more legitimacy
because they generally constitute city council action, which has the
force and effect of law. Mayoral executive orders are not ideal
A
because their permanence can be dependent on politics.
subsequent mayor can simply repeal the previous mayor's order.
City contracting of independent oversight boards is also not
conducive to stability because city council members will debate the
board's effectiveness multiple times a year in order to decide
129
whether to dedicate part of their often tight budget to this entity.
Voter referendum is the best avenue to create a long-standing
board. The boards of San Francisco, San Diego, Long Beach, and San
Jose were all created through voter referendum and have stood for
over twenty years. 130 On a practical note, such boards, stamped with
democratic approval, have more leverage in dealings with law
enforcement. Cooperation from law enforcement is fundamental to
a board's success. This mitigates the risk of boards becoming merely
symbolic and inactive.
Civilian oversight boards have also been mandated statewide,
but not regarding police misconduct. Georgia's Child Fatality Review
Panel consists of civilian members appointed for the purpose of
investigating the circumstances and causes surrounding child
This panel publishes annual reports and delegates
deaths. 131
investigations to county-level boards.132 Other states have followed
127. The Citizen Police Complaint Commission, CITY OF LONG BEACH, http://www.
longbeach.gov/cpcc/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
128. Jerome, supra note 126, at 42.
129. Santana, supra note 120.
130. Frequently Asked Questions,CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO: OFFICE OF CITIZEN

COMPLAINTS, http://sfgov.org/occ/frequently-asked-questions

(last visited Oct. 21,

2014); General Information, CITIZEN'S REVIEW BD. ON POLICE PRACTICES, CITIZENS' REVIEW
BD. ON POLICE PRACTICES, http://www.sandiego.gov/citizensreviewboard/geninfo/

index.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2014); CPCC History, THE CITIZEN COMPLAINT COMM'N,
http://www.longbeach.gov/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?BlobID=22764 (last visited
Oct. 21, 2014); Establishment of the Office, OFFICE OF THE INDEP. POLICE AUDITOR,

http://www.sanjoseca.gov/index.aspx?NID=687 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
131. GEORGIA CHILD FATALITY REVIEW PANEL, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2012), available at
https:/ /oca.georgia.gov/sites/oca.georgia.gov/

Annual%20Report%202011.pdf.
132. Id. at 8.

files/related-files/document/CFR%20
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suit, but not on their own accord. According to the 1996 amendments
made to the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA), each state receiving CAPTA funds is required to establish a
Citizen Review Panel. 133 Though unprecedented, civilian oversight
boards regarding police misconduct could be mandated statewide as
well. However, the above example is likely an anomaly given that the
boards were required by federal statute.
New York state leaders have debated about whether to
implement a statewide civilian review board. In April 2010, New
York Assembly Member Micah Kellner introduced a bill that would
create a board to oversee New York state police and peace officers,
including state troopers, Port Authority police, parks police, animal
control officers, and tax enforcers. 34 Kellner advocated for this
board by referring to the success of the NYC Complaint Review
Board in mending NYPD-community relations. 135 Kellner's bill
failed, but New York State Senator Jos6 M. Serrano reintroduced it in
February 2013, in response to an alleged incident between a resident
and the Roosevelt Island Public Safety Department, 136

IV. Judging Effectiveness
It is important to assess board effectiveness when deciding
whether to create new boards or extend current ones. What factors
should be used to judge effectiveness? Assessment of independent
investigatory boards could focus on sustained complaint rates and
the amount of complaints received each year. However, sustain
1 37
rates may not be the best measure because they are inherently low.
The most egregious and clear-cut offenses are often remedied in
other settings, such as criminal and civil suits. Less egregious
complaints often result in pitting the civilian's word against a police
officer's. Regardless of the standard of proof, it is tough to sustain a
complaint based on "he said, she said" alone. Additionally, many
complaints can be resolved through increasingly popular mediation
133. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiv) (2012).
134. News from Assembly Member Micah Z. Kellner, N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., Apr. 2010,
availableat http:/ /www.assembly.ny.gov/member-files/076/20100421/index.pdf.

135. Id.
136. Press Release, Jose M. Serrano, Senator Serrano Pushes for Review of Recent
Incidents Involving Roosevelt Island Public Safety Department, N.Y. State Senate (Feb.
11, 2013), available at http://www.nysenate.gov/press-release/senator-serrano-pushesreview-recent-incidents-involving-roosevelt-island-public-safet.
137. CITY OF BERKELEY POLICE REVIEW COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2012), available

at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/uploadedFiles/PoliceReviewCommission/Level_3__General/COMPLETE% 20(with %20Bookmarks) %202012%20STAT%20REPORT.pdf.
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programs in which both parties get together to exchange their sides
of the story.13 8 Lastly, the amount of complaints received is not a
reliable indicator of a board's success. The amount of complaints
received depends on several factors, such as the public's knowledge
of and accessibility to the complaint process, increased awareness of
proper police conduct, and policy changes in police practice. Thus,
judging the effectiveness of civilian oversight boards should not
depend on raw numbers.
Instead, the analysis should focus on more subjective factors.
These factors should correspond with board goals.1 39 Accordingly,
we must ask: [1] Has each board created a healthy dialogue between
law enforcement and the community? [2] Is the complaint process
accessible to civilians and are they comfortable with the process? [3]
Is the complaint process, whether conducted by internal affairs or by
independent investigatory boards, thorough, effective, timely, and
unbiased? [4] Are there opportunities for civilian influence on
policy-oriented matters regarding police practices? [5] How
transparent are police practices? [6] How transparent are IA
practices? [7] Does law enforcement cooperate with the board? These
are fundamental questions in which data is difficult to gather and
graph. To answer such questions, boards could routinely collect
opinion data from complainants and police officers through
questionnaires.
In contrast to simply relying on infrequent
anecdotes, surveying can provide a more reliable barometer. 140
Also, given the high availability and access to many of the
boards' reports, analyzing report quality, thoroughness, and
recommendations can also help track board effectiveness.14 1 Board
reports often identify systemic issues in law enforcement policies or
practices, and track that department's progress in resolving them in
subsequent reports. For example, in its 1998 report, the Portland
Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee found issues in
IA investigation quality due to IA investigators' favorable bias

138. CAROL ARCHBOLD, LEIGH HERBST & SAMUEL WALKER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, MEDIATING CITIZEN COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS: A GUIDE FOR

POLICE AND COMMUNITY LEADERS, vii (2002), availableat http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/
pdf/e04021486web.pdf.

139. Jerome, supra note 126, at 45.
140. Ashley Luthem, First-of-its-Kind Survey to Examine Attitudes Toward Milwaukee

Police, JOURNAL SENTINEL (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/
first-of-its-kind-survey-to-examine-attitudes-toward-miwaukee-police-b99128462z1229338041.html.
141. Lauri K. Stewart, Nuts and Bolts: Using the Tools of the Outreach Trade, in CITIZEN
OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 189,193 (Justina Cint6n Perino ed., Am. Bar Ass'n, 2006).
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toward police officers. 142 In a subsequent report, the Committee
noted that simply having a prepared set of objective questions
enhanced IA investigation quality. 143 San Jose's Office of the
Independent Police Auditor also reports annually and has a clear
track record of successfully advocating for policy change.1 44 From
1993 to 2009, this office made 109 policy recommendations and
approximately 78% of them were implemented by the San Jose
Police Department. 45 Thus, although it is difficult to make broad
generalizations about the degree of success in implementing civilian
oversight boards, it is clear that they can succeed in advocating for
progressive policy and ensure quality IA investigations.

V. Legitimizing Oversight Boards by Granting
Fundamental Powers
Granting powers such as disciplinary power and subpoena
power to oversight boards is a highly contested issue because such
powers have already been designated to other government officials.
Advocates for granting meaningful power stress that this is
necessary to prevent oversight boards from becoming "toothless
tigers." 46 On the surface, toothless tigers appear to have the power
to remedy civilian complaints. However, absent the proper tools,
they lack authority, making them symbolic and passive. In contrast,
oversight boards equipped with subpoena and/or disciplinary
power are further legitimized and have more leverage when
requesting law enforcement compliance.
A.

Subpoena Power

Subpoena power is essential for independent investigatory
board effectiveness and can also be important for auditing boards
that hear appeals. 47 Absent the power to compel officers to testify,
the thoroughness of an investigation suffers because the process
142. CITY OF PORTLAND CITIZEN ADVISORS TO THE POLICE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS

AUDITING COMM., supra note 81.
143. CITY OF PORTLAND CITIZEN ADVISORS TO THE POLICE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
AUDITING COMM., FIRST AND SECOND QUARTER 2001 MONITORING REPORT (2001),

availableat http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.cfm?&a=8782&c=27389.
144. SAN JOSE OFFICE OF THE INDEP. POLICE AUDITOR, 2011 IPA YEAR END REPORT 14

(2012), available at http://www.sanjoseca.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/144.

145. Id.
146. Al Baker, Independent Agency Gets New Powers to Prosecute New York Police
Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2012, at A20.
147. Walker, supra note 86, at 13.
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hinges upon each side voluntarily and truthfully sharing their side
of the story. For example, from 2011 to 2013, the Springfield (IL)
Police Community Review Commission heard two appeals of IA
decisions and the police officer in question refused to attend either of
the hearings. 148 As of 2013, Portland's Independent Police Review
division also lacks subpoena power and has not been able to gain
consistent compliance from officers, especially high-ranking ones,
for interview requests.149 Such acts of defiance go unchecked when
oversight boards have no legitimate authority.
Furthermore, subpoena power is necessary for getting officers to
testify against other officers.

As noted by the Police Commission

overseeing the LAPD, "Perhaps the greatest single barrier to the
effective investigation and adjudication of complaints is the officers'
unwritten code of silence [in which] an officer does not provide
adverse information against their fellow officer."'150 In describing the
cycle that perpetuates perjury and misconduct, the New York City
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the
Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department stated:
The pervasiveness of the code of silence is bolstered by
the grave consequences for violating [the code]: Officers
who report misconduct are ostracized and harassed;
become targets of complaints and even physical threats;
and are made to fear that they will be left alone on the
151
streets in a time of crisis.
At a public hearing for the above commission, Bernard Cawley,
a former NYPD officer, spoke about this "Blue Shield of Silence":
"Cops don't tell on cops. And if they did tell on them.., his career's
ruined. He's going to be labeled as a rat. So if he's got fifteen more
years to go on the job, he's going to be miserable because it follows
you wherever you go." 152 In February 2013, former LAPD officer
Christopher Dorner, mentioned the Blue Shield of Silence as a root of
his rampage against the police department. 153 Civilian oversight
148. Jason Nevel, FormerAlderman Calls for Changes to Police Commission, SPRINGFIELD
STATE JOURNAL-REGIsTER (Sep. 3, 2013), http://www.sj-r.com/x1837080538/Police-review-

panel-lacks-teeth.
149. Peter Kom, City Police Watchdog Wants More Bite, PORTLAND TRIBUNE (Nov. 14,
2013), http://portlandtribune.com/pt/9-news/200942-city-police-watchdog-wantsmore-bite.
150. REPORT OF THE INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEPT., supra note 85, at xx.
151. REPORT OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE POLICE CORRUFION, supra note 77, at 53.
152. Id.
153. The Board of Rights fired Dorner, holding that he lied about an incident in
which his training officer kicked a suspect in the head. Dorner vowed to continue his
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boards need subpoena power to have any chance of curbing this
cultural hindrance to promoting justice. In addition to ordering that
officers appear, board member presence during questioning could
help ensure objectivity.
In order to comply with police union law, subpoena power must
be granted by statute. 154 Those that oppose granting subpoena power
to oversight boards argue that granting such power would result in
obstructing both IA investigations and District Attorney investigative
and prosecutorial duties.155 Critics further argue that the potential for
abusing subpoena power, given the lack of standards in controlling its
use, could magnify this obstruction.15 6 Both the California Supreme
Court and Michigan Court of Appeals have dismissed this argument as
speculative and held that sound discretion in using this subpoena
power is presumed until there is evidence of abuse and obstruction.157
Such jurisprudence is essential to streamlining the board's investigatory
158
process and preventing their decay into "toothless tigers."
B.

Discipline Power

Police unions protest granting oversight boards the power to
discipline with more fervor because of the potential of affecting an
officer's job status (e.g., sanction, termination, probation violation)
and the general intrusiveness into the police force. 159 Delegating the
power to discipline intrudes on a basic tenant of law enforcement
affairs. 60 The power to dicipline solely belongs to the police
command structure. 161 The intrusive aspect is amplified by an "Us
versus Them" mentality within the "blue culture." 162 Loyalty and

killing spree of those involved in corruption before ultimately committing suicide while
surrounded by police in a burning house. Doug Saunders, Riverside DA Dismisses
Criminal Case Against Christopher Dorner, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUN (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.sbsun.com/general-news/20131104/riverside-da-dismisses-criminal-caseagainst-christopher-dorner.
154. Ronald Kramer & Elayne G. Gold, Collective Bargaining and Labor Agreements:
Challenges to Citizen Oversight, in CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 79, 88

(Justina Cint6n Perino ed., American Bar Ass'n, 2006).
155. Dibb v. County of San Diego, 884 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Cal. 1994).
156. Dibb, 884 P.2d at 1210; Vance v. Ananich, 378 N.W.2d 616,619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
157. Dibb, 884 P.2d at 1210; Vance v. Ananich, 378 N.W.2d 616,619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
158. A different avenue in ensuring officer compliance with interview requests
includes making cooperation mandatory as per their employment contract. See SAMUEL
WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT 72 (2000).
159. Baker, supra note 146.
160. Hudson, supra note 62, at 521.
161. Id.
162. REPORT OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE POLICE CORRUPTION, supranote 77, at 58.
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insularity within law enforcement perpetuates a divide in which,
"[f]ar too many officers see the public as a source of trouble rather

than as the people they are sworn to serve."

63

Tension is at its

highest when the power dynamic between the police and the

community is flipped and the police are subject to the disciplinary
power of an entity symbolic of the community.164
Advocates for granting boards the power to discipline argue
that, absent this power, boards merely serve an advisory role and
give recommendations. The chief of police or city manager makes
the ultimate, unchallengeable decision, which does not have to align
with the board's recommendation. 165 If the chief of police or city
manager consistently declines to follow the recommendations, then
this truly transforms oversight boards into "toothless tigers."
Recent relations between the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Use
of Force Review Board and the Clark County Sheriff's Department are
166
demonstrative of the conflict that arises from this power dynamic.
Four members of the Board resigned in protest after Sheriff Doug
Gillespie refused to comply with the Board's recommendation that he
fire Officer Jacquar Roston. 167 Gippespie found the officer's apology
sufficient for shooting a man because the officer mistook a metallic
sticker on his hat for a gun.168 Resigning Co-Chair of the Board Robert
Martinez stated, "I can't be part of this process when I know, going in,
that ultimately, ... the fix is in. The deck is stacked against the board
and will always be stacked against the board. No matter what the
recommendation is of the board, the sheriff, he gets to overturn it."169
Other resigning Board members stated, in response to Gippespie's
decision, "It's offensive. Why are we here?" and "I don't want to
waste my time, my energy and my emotions and have it turn out

badly."1 70

163. REPORT OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE POLICE CORRUPTION, supranote 77, at 58.

164. Baker, supra note 146.
165. Bobb, supra note 88, at 163.
166. Nathan Baca, Several Members of Use of Force Board Resign, KLAS-TV (July 31,
2013), http://www.8newsnow.com/story/22984008/several-members-of-use-of-forceboard-resign.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Mike Blasky, Five Use of Force Board Members Resign Over Sheriffs Decision to
Save Cop's Job, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (July 31, 2013), http://www.reviewjournal
.corn/news/ crime-courts/five-use-force-board-members-resign-over-sheriffs-decisionsave-cops-job.
170. Id.; Jackie Valley, Does Metro Police's use of Force Review Board Carry any Weight
with the Sheriff?, LAS VEGAS WEEKLY (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.lasvegasweekly.com/
as-we-see-it/2013/aug/07/does-metro-polices-use-force-review-board-carry-an.

HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12

In opposition, Police Protective Association Executive Director,
Chris Collins, stated,
I think the board does a good job looking at use of
force. I think, ultimately, the board has to be reminded that
their findings are recommendations to the sheriff. It's not
something that is set in stone. The sheriff has to make the
ultimate decision on discipline or termination with the
agency. 171
It is as simple as that. Regardless of the quality of their work
and the merit in their recommendations, the decision is ultimately
out of the Board's hands and the Sheriff has no obligation to follow
their advice. Members of boards without any form of discipline
power may be left with the difficult decision: Either stay, knowing
that the fruits of your labor can be rendered valueless, or walk away.
However, there is a middle ground within this power struggle.
Cities can mandate that a police chief provide written explanations
to oversight boards when he or she decides not to follow the board's
recommendations. This suggestion was proposed in amending the
Portland City Charter in October 2013.172 Portland Police Chief Mike
73
Reese opposed this amendment in a meeting with City Council.
He stated that forcing him to comply with this written explanation
requirement would raise privacy concerns given that he may take
personal, mitigating factors into consideration when making a
decision. 174 This may result in a "chilling effect," in which officers
might be reluctant to discuss personal matters during the
disciplinary process due to fear of having them released to the
public.175 This requirement is also redundant because the police
chief is already obligated to brief the mayor, who then must approve
176
or disapprove of his decision.
Oversight boards could also manage the police chief's power
through a discipline matrix, which would ensure consistency and

171. Patranya Bhoolsuwan & Sharie Johnson, Committee to Appoint Use of Force
Review Board Members, KLAS-TV (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.8newsnow.com/
story/23805386/committee-to-appoint-new-use-of-force-review-board-members.
172. Maxine Bernstein, Portland Police Chief Objects to Several Proposals Intended to
Strengthen Police Oversight, THE OREGONIAN (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.
oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2013/10/portland-police-chief objects.html.
173. Id.
174. Id.

175. Id.
176. Id.
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fairness. 7 Discipline matrices set forth particular disciplinary
action depending on objective factors, such as the severity of the
offense and whether the officer has been disciplined before. 78 The
police chief's discretion is limited to the ranges of discipline within
this matrix. 179 Critics of this idea argue that such a system limits a
police chief's duty to handle each case on an individual basis and
consider mitigating circumstances, such as past work record and
sincerity in remedying the grievance. 8 0
C.

Access to Records

Access to law enforcement records is essential to an oversight
board's ability to review complaints and conduct policy analysis.
However, oversight boards are often denied access to such records
per municipal, state, or federal law, or a police labor union
agreement. Also, as discussed in Part V.B. of this Note, officers do
not welcome intrusion into their personal affairs and often prefer
that their personal records be kept from the public. Confidentiality
can still be preserved when oversight boards are given access to
these documents, so long as they are required to not release the
substance of those records to the public (i.e., redacting released
documents and not including specific information about officers in
oversight board reports).
The California Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled on this
confidentiality issue in 2003.181 Individual officers of the San Diego
City Police Department and their police officers' association filed a
petition for a writ of mandate to prevent the city manager from
releasing a narrative report produced by the San Diego Citizens
Review Board, which described a police killing of a civilian. 82 The
court held that the city manager and Review Board were statutorily
prohibited from releasing this information because it was considered
confidential per the California Penal Code and could only be
released under certain circumstances under the Evidence Code.183
The court noted that the legislature intended for the evidence
exception to be limited to criminal and civil proceedings; thus,

177. Korn, supra note 149.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Davis v. City of San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 4th 893, 898 (Ct. App. 2003).
182. Id. at 896.
183. Id. at 897-98.

HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12

public disclosure of that information is otherwise prohibited. 184 This
is an appropriate limit on spreading confidential personnel records,
in their entirety, to the public. However, the limit on general public
access should not be construed as a blanket prohibition of oversight
board access. Some access is necessary for the complaint process to
function properly.
In addition to this limited scope, municipal and county codes
can be adopted to legitimize oversight board access to records and
foster cooperation with law enforcement. Absent such legitimacy,
the polarizing "Us versus Them" mentality, on both sides, can result
in tension, uncooperativeness, and ineffectiveness. For example,
Joyce M. Hicks of the San Francisco OCC noted a high degree of
cooperation from the San Francisco Police Department (hereinafter
"SFPD"), which resulted from granting the Office authority and
making the jurisdictional lines clear. 85 As per the City Charter, the
OCC must receive "prompt and full cooperation and assistance"
from the Police Department in carrying out OCC objectives.1 86
Despite this requirement, when the OCC was initially created, its
investigators could not consistently, nor in a timely manner, get the
documents they requested. 18 7
In response, the city's police
commission adopted a resolution which stated precisely how many
days the SFPD had to produce requested documents. 188
Additionally, if the SFPD did not produce the documents within the
time frame, then they would have to provide an explanation to the
police commission. 89 Given these successes, according to Hicks,
oversight boards should seek legislative backing in gaining police
cooperation regarding records requests. 190

VI. Recommendations
A.

Discipline Power

The power to discipline should be left in the hands of the police
chief. This power is essential to anyone that sits at the forefront of
any organization in which they lead subordinates. Police chiefs are
already answerable to the mayor, which is sufficient to ensure that
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Davis, Cal. App 4th at 902.
Korn, supra note 149.
S.F., CAL., MUN. CODE art. IV, § 4.127 (2004).
Korn, supra note 149.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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they do not abuse their authority. However, oversight boards
should be notified of police chief disciplinary decisions with
sufficient detail, so that where there is disagreement, they can
engage in a dialogue with the mayor or police commission. For
instance, according to Joyce Hicks, "director of the [San Francisco]
Office of Citizen Complaints, she has done just that and succeeded in
getting police officers fired after the chief recommended less severe
discipline." 191 Furthermore, since elected officials, mayors, and
police chiefs are answerable to the public, exposing a track record of
perceived unjust disciplinary decisions can sufficiently hold them
accountable. The dynamics explained above should prevent police
board
from
oversight
grossly
deviating
chiefs
from
recommendations, which makes infringing upon their disciplinary
authority unnecessary.
B.

Access to Records

As stated earlier, an oversight board's power to access police
records is essential to their function. Cities and counties must still
account for and respect police officer privacy. Local governments
should grant access, but limit it appropriately to account for those
privacy concerns. In addition, law enforcement should be required to
cooperate in order to alleviate the polarizing tension of civilian
oversight. Thus, in order to properly give oversight boards the power
to access police records, cities should pass local laws requiring police
cooperation, while also accounting for privacy concerns.

C.

California-Specific Recommendations

Given that about 50% of all law enforcement departments in the
country consist of ten or fewer sworn officers, it would be
192
impractical for every department to have its own oversight board.
This would be a waste of administrative and economic resources
because such small departments do not generate enough complaints
in a given year. However, in California, there is still a clear void in
civilian oversight. Although many of California's most populous

cities have civilian oversight boards, some cities have yet to create
one. As noted in Part I, Bakersfield, the 9th largest city in California,
still lacks a board, a void exposed by the death of David Silva. If
191. Korn, supra note 149.
192. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, LOCAL POLICE DEPMS. 9 (2007), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/

pub/pdf/Ipd07.pdf.
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passed, a state ballot initiative mandating oversight boards for every
county or based on city population size could ensure widespread
oversight. Across the country, there are two local police officers for
every 1,000 citizens. 193 California could mandate oversight boards
for cities with populations of at least 200,000 because the presence of
400 or more officers may generate enough complaints to warrant the
associated costs. However, most California cities of over 200,000
already have some form of oversight, so mandating county boards
would be more encompassing.
Notably, San Bernardino County has no form of civilian
oversight. This is especially alarming given the population and
amount of crime throughout the county. 94 The prevalence and
gravity of police misconduct is compounded in high crime areas
with large minority populations where there is an "Us versus Them"
mentality in police-community relations. 195
Given budget
constraints, it would be most practical to institute a county-level
board. At a minimum, the most populous cities within San
Bernardino County should contribute to the $60,000 per year needed
to fund an ombudsman to oversee IA.
D.

Ferguson, Missouri

In light of the Michael Brown killing and resulting city unrest, the
196
Ferguson City Council proposed a pure monitoring board.
Proposed Municipal Code Section 33-26 (a) enumerates the board's
powers, duties and responsibilities:
The citizen review board shall act in an advisory capacity to
the Mayor, City Council, City Manager, and Chief of Police
on policy matters relating to the operations of the
department. Policy matters shall be defined to include
manpower levels and salaries, budgets, community relations,

193. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 192.
194. STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., CJSC
STATISTICS: CRIMES AND CLEARANCES, availableat http://oag.ca.gov/crime/cjsc/stats/
crimes-clearances;
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CITIZEN REVIEW OF POLICE:

APPROACHES AND IMPLEMENTATION (Mar. 2001), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf
filesl/nij/184430.pdf.
195. REPORT OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE POLICE CORRUPTION, supra note 77, at 58.
196. Jessica Lussenhog, Ferguson Mayor James Knowles Details Proposed Civilian Review
Boardfor Police, RIVERFRONT TIMES (St. Louis) (Sep. 11, 2014), http://blogs.riverfront
times.com/dailyrft/2014/09/ferguson-mayor-james-knowles-explains-changes-to-city

s_municipal_|awscitizen review.boarddocuments.php.
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197
training programs and law enforcement programs.

As proposed, the board would have no investigative powers
and could only give recommendations to the Chief of Police.198 The
Chief of Police would be under no obligation to implement the
recommendations. 199 Additionally, the proposed municipal code
does not grant the board access to police records. 200 This omission
could stifle the board's ability to identify systemic issues and make
informed recommendations. Lastly, the proposed code section is
completely devoid of outreach and transparency measures. 201 It is
unclear whether the board meetings would be open to the public
and allow public input.202 While the city council's proposal is a
starting point, it is the bare minimum. An auditing board, with
access to records and a focus on public involvement, could be most
conducive to healing the city of Ferguson.

Conclusions
A.

Independent Investigatory Boards Are Easily Weakened

Independent investigatory boards are bound to fail if they do not
have the requisite support from their local government. Absent this
support, independent boards are less likely to have the fundamental
powers necessary to overcome police-oversight board tension.
Additionally, such boards are less likely to be adequately funded,
which affects administrative quality. Patrick J. Lynch, President of the
New York City Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, bluntly described
his frustrations with New York City's Civilian Complaint Review
Board: "Our problem with the C.C.R.B. has always been first, their
predisposition that police officers are always wrong, second, their
inexperienced investigators who conduct faulty investigations that
arrive at improper conclusions, and now those wrong conclusions will
be prosecuted at these kangaroo trials." 203 This statement is illustrative
of the polarized tension created by implementing independent
investigatory boards and structural flaws resulting from building a
complex complaint process from the ground up.
197. Lussenhog, supra note 169.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Baker, supra note 146.
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Effective administration cannot be built without the proper
funding, resources, and attention to quality management. Although
the San Francisco OCC is recognized as one of the most successful
independent investigatory boards, in its 2013 Third Quarter
Statistical Report, it noted that budget and staffing constraints have
20 4
remained a roadblock to efficient and timely case resolution.
Additionally, independent investigatory boards often have
issues that arise from not having legitimized power. As stated
previously, boards should not have any formal disciplining power.
This power is most appropriate in the hands of police chiefs who,
given their accountability to their respective mayors and the public,
are discouraged
from grossly deviating from discipline
recommendations.
Although independent investigatory boards
need subpoena power and access to records, they often face an
uphill battle in attaining those powers. This is in large part due to
the adversarial nature of police-oversight board relations. Absent
these powers, independent investigatory boards are dependent on
law enforcement's willingness to cooperate. "Blue culture" and an
"Us versus Them" mentality can stifle the investigatory process.
B.

Contrasting Independent Investigatory Boards with Auditing
Boards

Due to the dynamics of independent investigatory boards
discussed above, the auditing model has a greater likelihood of
success. The auditing model does not require a group of civilians to
build a review process from the ground up; rather, they manage a
review process already in place. These boards are less susceptible to
funding and staffing issues. Auditing boards can be most effective
by working side by side with IA investigators to ensure quality
control. The issues that investigators tackle are time sensitive and
thus, errors are harder to correct if caught after a completed
investigation. Additionally, authority and cooperation are less of an
issue for auditing boards given that their work can be better
described as working with law enforcement rather than against.
Lastly, gauging the effectiveness of independent investigatory
boards is complex, whereas the potential benefit of auditing boards is
clear.205
Oversight board reports reveal enhancement of IA
investigation quality and police practices through policy changes.
204. SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, 2013 THIRD QUARTER
STATISTICAL REPORT 10, availableat http://www.sfgov3.org/modules/showdocument
.aspx?documentid=5913.
205. See infra Part IV.
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C.

Pure Monitoring Boards as a Last Resort

Pure monitoring boards are most appropriate for cities with
limited resources because a multi-functioning board requires proper
staffing. However, pure monitoring boards represent the minimum
threshold in oversight and can be appropriate as a foundational
beginning.
A truly successful oversight board must be multifunctioning, by focusing on both broad policy issues and the intricacies
of the complaint process.
D.

Focus on Community Outreach and Transparency

Regardless of the type of board adopted, community outreach and
transparency must be a main focus. This is the quintessential, but often
forgotten, task.20 6

Oversight boards should focus on serving the

community they were designed to represent. Accordingly, boards
should make the complaint process comfortable, clear and accessible in
order to build community confidence that their grievances will be
heard. Boards should also hold periodic, public meetings during which
civilians can express their concerns about their police department. This
type of dialogue can be effective in identifying problem areas within the
respective police department. Communication can be most easily
bolstered through the Internet. This is the perfect avenue to advertise
public meetings, explain the complaint process clearly and publish

reports with their findings. This community-oriented outreach is
essential to mending the police-community relationship.
For this reason, contracting with a single ombudsman or adopting
the business model is not the ideal form of oversight. A single
ombudsman cannot feasibly monitor an entire IA bureau while still
remaining highly accessible to the community because outreach is a
great time commitment. Additionally, in order to focus on outreach, an
ombudsman would have to ask the city for more hours, which means
more money. 207 The business model is not conducive to meeting
community-oriented goals because their goals are driven by their
expertise. Their expertise is in auditing IA investigations and statistics
in order to perform policy analysis, not in community leadership.

206. Cleve R. Wootson Jr., Recommendations on CMPD Citizens Review Board Expected
Today, WCNC (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.wcnc.com/news/local/Recommendationson-CMPD-Citizens-Review-Board-expected-224846532.html.
207. Greenwald, supra note 72.
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